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29 
Clinging to the Common Law in an Age of 
Statutes: Criminal Law in the States 
Michael G. Heyman† 
 INTRODUCTION  
March 20, 2014, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the 
conviction of Javier Fernandez for aggravated discharge of a 
firearm in the direction of a peace officer.1 Taken alone, that’s 
unexceptional, as is the issue of whether the evidence 
supported that conviction. However, things start to turn 
strange when we learn that Fernandez neither discharged the  
firearm, nor even knew that the confederate who did so 
was armed.2 Thus, unable to affirm the conviction based on his 
actions, the Court relied on a peculiar notion of accountability 
known locally as “common design.”3 More generally, this odd 
view parades under the name of the “natural and probable 
consequences doctrine,” whereby guilt for the first offense 
automatically entails guilt for all subsequent offenses.4  
Its use here reflects three troubling features of many 
recent judicial decisions on criminal law: 1. An apparent 
inability to deal with criminal statutes that alter the common 
law, 2. A preference for judicial policymaking over conflicting 
legislative norms, and 3. An indifference to the quality of 
criminal law doctrine, as that body of law seemingly has few 
champions.5 Fortunately, a major development in the 1960s led 
 
†  Professor Emeritus, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago). 
 1. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, available at http://www.state.il 
.us/court/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2014/115527.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 2. “Here, however, the State failed to produce any evidence showing that 
defendant even knew Gonzalez had a gun, let alone that he knew that 
Gonzalez would discharge that gun in the direction of a police officer.” Id. at 4. 
 3. Id. at 5. 
 4. See generally, JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 
475 (6TH ed. 2012). As Dressler points out, this reflects the common law view, 
and is the “law today in most jurisdictions . . . .” Id. 
 5. Observing the dismal state of things, the late Bill Stuntz said: 
“Criminal law scholars may be talking to each other (and to a few judges), but 
they do not appear to be talking to anyone else.” William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 508 (2001). 
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to widespread criminal law reform, dramatically affecting the 
codes of numerous states. Remaining to be seen was the depth, 
breadth and lasting pervasiveness of those changes. 
I.  SOME DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND   
For centuries, Criminal Law contained a veritable morass 
of peculiar, morally-tinged and nonfunctional doctrine, chiefly 
in the area of culpability.6 For nearly ten years, the American 
Law Institute worked on the creation of a model code to 
improve this situation, culminating in its promulgation of the 
Model Penal Code in 1962.7 Through it, this welter of mental 
states was reduced to four: Purpose, knowledge, recklessness 
and negligence.8 Leading to law reform in dozens of states, the 
Code stood as a signal achievement in defining the conditions 
legitimizing the imposition of criminal sanctions on our 
citizens. 
These achievements were particular noteworthy and 
valuable in the area of accomplice liability, as the common law 
represented an ungainly, baroque structure often yielding 
unjust results.9 The Code solution, by contrast, proved 
particularly clean and elegant, predicating liability on an 
individual’s purposeful participation in the criminal 
enterprise.10 This formulation perfectly mirrors established 
predicates for guilt: One must engage in a voluntary act, with 
the prescribed mental state present.11 However, the challenge 
here was particularly urgent as, by definition, we’re talking 
about guilt for the criminal conduct of another, derivative 
liability. Rejecting any version of guilt by association, the Code 
required a linkage between criminal actors demonstrating the 
accomplice’s commitment to achieving each criminal objective. 
The very title of the Code’s section on accountability 
signals this necessary linkage: “Liability for Conduct of 
Another; Complicity.”12 Too complex to discuss in detail here, 
 
 6. Concepts such as general and specific intent, abandoned and 
malignant heart, vicious will, implied and express malice and malice 
aforethought generally littered criminal cases and confounded juries alike. 
 7. MODEL PENAL CODE Pt. I: General Provisions (Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1985), Pt. II: Definition of Specific Crimes (Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1980).   
 8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. 
 9. Its manifold categories of principals and accessories were bedeviling, 
as were its corresponding culpability notions. 
 10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (3)(a).  
 11. That is, absolute liability is strongly disfavored by the Code. 
 12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06. 
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that section nevertheless establishes very basic requirements 
for guilt. Stating that a person is “guilty of an offense if it is 
committed by his own conduct,” it then proceeds to elaborate on 
the requirements for derivative liability, that is when someone 
is legally accountable for the conduct of another that constitutes 
the target offense.13 For present purposes, this critical section 
predicates accountability on one’s being an accomplice to each 
crime, which itself requires the purposeful promotion or 
facilitation of the target offense.14 As an accomplice then, that 
conduct is hers, as if she had engaged in it herself.15 
The Illinois code took the same tack, even predating the 
official Code by one year. Duplicating the same principles and 
language, it carefully divides the principal Code section, thus 
making clear its mechanism for establishing when one is 
accountable for the conduct of another “which an element of an 
offense.”16 Establishing this closed system for liability, it 
requires proof of purposeful aid to establish complicity, crime 
by crime. “Common design” obviously violates this scheme by 
definition, providing automatic liability for all subsequent 
offenses.  
II.  GETTING DOWN TO CASES—BUT NOT STATUTES   
Javier Fernandez was convicted of a single count of firearm 
discharge, and sentenced to 12 years in prison.17 Part of a 
botched burglary of a parked car, Fernandez remained in his 
vehicle while his friend, Gonzalez, tried to steal the car’s 
radio.18 Moments later, he heard shots, as he pulled out of the 
parking space.19 Gonzalez had fired the shots at a police officer, 
though Fernandez was unaware that he was even armed at 
that time.20 They had not been together.21 
 
 13. Id. at § 2.06(1). Understand, this entire machinery provides a 
mechanism through which the conduct of another is imputed to the 
accomplice, as if she had engaged in it herself. 
 14. Id. 
 15. For a more extensive discussion of this precise topic, see Michael G. 
Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case Study in 
Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW 388 (2010). 
 16. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1 (West 1993).  That section is 
captioned “Accountability for Conduct of Another” and the following section 
bears the label of “When accountability exists.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/5-2 (West 1993). 
 17. 2014 IL 115527 at 1. 
 18. Id. at 2–4. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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Intuitively, we do see Fernandez as part of the 
unsuccessful burglary, but also see him as clearly innocent on 
the firearm charge. Indeed, it would seem wildly 
disproportionate to sentence him to twelve years for so little 
participation22. Obviously the courts did not agree. But why 
not? That’s partially answered by the difficulty courts seem to 
have accepting statutes that depart from the common law, and 
in coping with those statutes themselves. 
Entirely ignoring both statutory language and legislative 
history, the Fernandez court proclaimed the accountability 
statute as embodying the “intent” of incorporating “the 
principle of the common- design rule.”23 Totally unsupportable, 
that remark both flouts the statutory language as well as 
expert commentary on that language.24 Moreover, though the 
Illinois legislature recently codified this common design rule, 
the court failed to even cite to that section, though it could have 
been dispositive.25 Instead, it turned to ancient case law in 
support of its assertions, preferring precedent to statutory 
interpretation. 
Forty years previously, a poor zhlub named Rudy Kessler 
had the misfortune to team up with the wrong people at the 
wrong time.26 Setting out with this group to get their hands on 
 
 22. See generally, Michael G. Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just 
Proportion: The Peculiar Law of Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
129 (2013) (explaining the rampant confusion and resultant unfairness among 
accountability laws). 
 23. 2014 IL 115527at 5. 
 24. Code commentary referred to this “probability consequence” theory as 
“incongruous and unjust,” noting that, “if anything, the culpability level for 
the accomplice should be higher than that of the principal actor, because there 
is generally more ambiguity in the overt conduct” of that actor and thus “a 
higher risk of convicting the innocent.”(Emphasis supplied.) MODEL PENAL 
CODE Pt. I: General Provisions (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985), 
Pt. II: Definition of Specific Crimes (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980), comments at note 42. Similarly, the Illinois Committee Comments from 
1961 note that the new section “alters and modifies the former law.” S.H.A., 
commentary to section 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 (West 1993). 
Moreover, it clearly provides that “liability under this subsection requires an 
‘intent to promote or facilitate’” the substantive crime. Id. The Court was 
clearly wrong about so-called “legislative intent.” 
 25. The current code (applicable to this case), in an unlettered paragraph 
reads: “When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or 
agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by 
one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or 
agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those 
further acts.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 (2008). As previously noted, 
this section creates an internal conflict within that section on the basis for 
accomplice liability. 
 26. People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d 493 (1974). 
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some money, he sat in the passenger seat of the car, as his two 
unarmed compatriots entered a bar after closing at which 
Kessler had once worked.27 Somehow, gunfire was exchanged as 
they fired an available gun inside, as well as from their fleeing 
vehicle.28 Ultimately, all were convicted on two counts of 
attempted murder (as well as burglary) and sentenced to 5-15 
years on each count.29 
The appellate court reversed the attempted murder 
convictions, finding them unsupported by the governing 
statute, as Kessler never intended to kill anyone.30 However, 
grudgingly announcing that result,31 it nevertheless expressed 
its preference for common design as “a more reasonable 
approach to the law of accountability but one which we cannot 
adopt in contravention of the language of the Code.”32 The state 
Supreme Court felt no such compunctions, and has not in the 
intervening 40 years. 
Ultimately, the resurrection of this legal relic was the 
product of the Court’s interpretation of a single word, 
“conduct.” In Kessler, the state argued that an accomplice to the 
target offense was responsible for all subsequent conduct of his 
cohorts even, as there, that unplanned pair of attempted 
murders. Accepting that argument, that Court latched onto 
that single word, ignoring both context and the obvious purpose 
of accountability under the then-recent code. It arrived at this 
staggering conclusion by citing to the general definition of 
“conduct” within the code as “an act or series of acts, and the 
accompanying mental state.”33 Thus was created an open-ended 
liability wholly ignoring basic principles of culpability. Gone 
was the requirement that punishment follows one’s choice to 
commit harm, replaced instead by guilt by association. 
Naturally, that entirely dissociates that word from its 
context. An accomplice is responsible for conduct that is an 
element of the offense in which she participated. Of course that 
includes the act or acts that comprise that conduct, but to read 
 
 27. Id. at 49–95. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 11 Ill. App. 3d 321, 323 (1973) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 57 Ill. 2d 493 
(1974). 
 30. 57 Ill. 2d 493 (1974). Understand that to purposefully promote 
something, he must obviously know of it and, as here, intend to achieve its 
objective, here the death of the two victims. 
 31. The court noted that the “Code provision . . . substantially departs 
from prior Illinois law . . . .” 11 Ill. App. 3d at 327, n.3. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 57 Ill. 2d at 496 (referencing section 5/2-4). 
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a word apart from surrounding language and context reveals a 
startling inability to cope with statutes. Whether driven by 
ideology, incompetence or a simple indifference to results in 
attempting to clear the docket, the Kessler result stood as a low 
point in Illinois criminal jurisprudence. Accordingly, when 
Fernandez went up to the Court, many hoped to see the demise 
of common design, through one mechanism or another.  
III.  STARE DECISIS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION   
Over a quarter-century ago, Bill Eskridge observed an 
unduly strong presumption of correctness afforded to statutory 
precedents.34 In the intervening years, he and others have 
written on this and, more importantly, created a true discipline 
of statutory interpretation. Unfortunately, like many courts 
nationwide, the Fernandez court seemed methodologically 
frozen in time, unaffected by the progress of the academy. 
That’s poignantly demonstrated by its deference to Kessler. 
The Fernandez appellate court affirmed the conviction, 
over a marvelous concurrence by Justice Gordon. The only 
judge in either appellate court to even cite to the common-
design section, he urged his panel to consider the statute “as an 
entirety.”35 Rejecting the notion of an anomalous provision 
providing a separate, conflicting, basis for liability, he 
harmonized it within that statute, thus requiring proof on 
intent to promote each particular offense charged. That 
approach was as soundly dismissed by the Supreme Court, as 
was the appellate opinion in Kessler itself. Its reasoning was 
rejected “in its entirety.”36 
Indeed, three aspects of the Court’s opinion reflect its 
disdain for legislation and apotheosis of judicial policymaking. 
First, forsaking statutory analysis, it instead labeled Kessler a 
“textbook application of the common-design rule,” and it 
dictated the Fernandez result.37 Pure stare decisis of statutory 
 
 34. William N. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. J. 
1361 (1988). Eskridge is currently the John A. Garver Professor of 
Jurisprudence at Yale Law School. He and the late Philip Frickey pioneered 
the development of interpretation as a serious discipline, bringing it into the 
modern era, indeed in creating that era itself. 
 35. 2012 IL App (1st) 101913-U, appeal allowed (May 29, 2013), appeal 
pending (May 2013), aff'd, 2014 IL 115527 at 17, available at http:// 
illinoiscourts.gov/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2012/1stDistrict/1101913_R23.p
df (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). 
 36. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527 at 6. 
 37. Id. Additionally, the Court found it “difficult to conceive of two 
unrelated cases that are more factually alike than these two.” Id. at 7. 
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interpretation, that. Second, it quoted approvingly from the 
State’s brief, in which it said “conceding his guilt for the 
burglary . . . defendant has effectively conceded his guilt for 
[the] aggravated discharge of a firearm.”38 A chilling statement, 
the Court nevertheless noted, “This is exactly right.”39 Finally, 
when confronted by recent case law that at least nuanced 
common design, trying to give some actual meaning to the term 
(resulting in overturned convictions), it emphatically rejected 
those cases to “correct that mistake so that similar missteps are 
avoided going forward.”40 With each move, it asserted the 
primacy of the judiciary in the development of criminal law 
doctrine, thereby resisting the changes made by the code over 
53 years previously.41 
  CLOSING REFLECTIONS   
Fernandez is remarkable, but this Essay is no mere case 
note. Rather, providing a snapshot of one facet of our criminal 
justice system, it offers a disquieting reminder of the uneasy 
relationship between courts and legislatures. Ronald Dworkin 
devoted an extraordinary career to distinguishing these roles, 
noting how “legislation invites judgments of policy that 
adjudication does not, by observing how inclusive integrity 
enforces distinct judicial constraints of role.”42 Always insisting 
on this distinction between policy and principle, he saw no 
room for the kind of judicial meddling discussed here. Uniquely 
suited to making these policy decisions, legislatures properly 
decide critical issues (with the appropriate tools) about how we 
treat our citizens in both the fact and severity of the criminal 
sanctions imposed for transgressions. They have a democratic 
legitimacy entirely lacking in the judiciary. 
By contrast, in perhaps the ultimate irony, the very 
codification of common design in 2009 represents a perverse 
 
Remarkably, the factual similarities consist of the total unawareness of the 
poor accomplice of what his companions were doing. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. In fact, the United States Supreme Court decided a similar case on 
March 5, 2014. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). There, the 
two offenses were a drug offense and use of a firearm. Id. at 1243. 
Highlighting the relationship between choice and culpability, Justice Kagan 
noted that “When an accomplice knows nothing of a gun until it appears at the 
scene, . . . the defendant has not shown the requisite intent to assist a crime 
involving a gun.” Id. at 1249. 
 42. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 410 (1986). 
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victory for common law, a common law smuggled in as a code 
amendment, and entirely ignored by a court that had been 
applying the self-same notion for decades, perceiving no need 
for legislative approval. Formally a part of the Illinois code, it 
serves little purpose other than as a reminder of the resilience 
of common law theory. 
A law reform commission dominated by prosecutors 
proposed it as part of a package sent to the state legislature in 
2009-10.43 Thus, proclaiming common design the law “for over 
one hundred and fifty years,” it referred it to the state 
legislature, which, undoubtedly unwittingly, embedded it in the 
existing section on accountability.44 Indeed, that language 
coming verbatim from Kessler was inserted unchanged, 
containing usage ill suited to legislation.45 In all of this we feel 
that deeper politics of criminal law creation, one Stuntz 
observed “always pushes toward broader liability rules, and 
toward harsher sentences as well.”46 
Yet, a technical parsing of these issues should not obscure 
the fundamental injustices wrought by common law trumping 
careful legislative deliberations and choices, especially on 
accountability. “Common design” imposes guilt by metaphor, 
while the real criminal actors must be proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt as to all material elements of the offense.47 As 
I have said previously, common law notions pervade modern 
criminal law in the face of flatly conflicting statutes throughout 
the United States. However, here the results are most malign. 
Providing an open-ended, culpability-free basis for liability, it 
permits the punishment of people who have never committed 
the offenses charged. Through that, it thoughtlessly affects 
countless lives, indeed taking people’s lives from them without 
the slightest justification. 
[Editor’s Note: In the next issue of this journal, Professor 
Heyman will examine some very recent developments in this 
 
 43. Designated, the CLEAR Commission, it replaced one earlier chaired 
by Paul Robinson, one that emphatically denounced this doctrine. For 
information on CLEAR, see the materials at http://clearinitiative.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014).  
 44. James R. Thompson, et al., The Illinois Criminal Code of 2009: 
Providing Clarity in the Law, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 815, 823 (2008).  
 45. The language appears in Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 496-97. The particularly 
odd language is that saying the acts of one are “considered to be” that of all. 
That’s not a cognizable legal concept. 
 46. Stuntz, supra note 5, at 51 (emphasis in original). 
 47. Such as Gonzalez in the Fernandez case. 
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area, and will consider the Constitutionality of the doctrine 
itself.] 
 
